1 Conservation biologist Michael Soule writes, I dont think theres anything terribly unusual about a field having an ethical foundation. They all do. Theres always either implicit or explicit norms for whatever humans do. We tend to think theres a dichotomy, though, in science between the normative and non-normative disciplines. This is also a myth (1994, 103). Soule is surely correct that every science is grounded in norms; however, not all of these norms are ethical and it is not obvious at all that all sciences have ethical foundations.
2 It should be noted that it is possible for these aims to conflict, both at a time and over time, and scientists may weight their importance relative to other aims.
3 Of course the content of these various aims is extremely controversial. For example, the debate over scientific realism is in part a debate about what the aims of science are, what they should be, and whether they can be attained (van Fraassen 1980, Churchland and Hooker 1988).
4 One way in which to demarcate endogenous and exogenous contextual values is to identify their proximate mechanisms. For example, a conservation biologists formative experiences surely are affected by society at large. However, in some cases, her scientific work is directly, and hence most proximately, affected by her own values whatever their origin. Likewise, in some instances, particular values most directly enter science from society. A contextual value is endogenous or exogenous depending on what is the most proximate mechanism for that value’s introduction into scientific practice.
5 For a sample of the controversy, see the June 1996 issue of Conservation Biology and David Takacs The Idea of Biodiversity.
6 E. D. McCoy (1996, 920) argues that the term advocacy has been used in very different ways in this debate.
7 It is true that anti-environmentalists might disagree with arguments for the preservation of ecological systems on the basis of aesthetic values. However, the disagreements are of two sorts. First, some brownlashers will argue that aesthetic values are trumped by economic values. If the choice is between the jobs of loggers and hence their well-being and the cute Northern spotted owls, then the well-being of the loggers takes priority since they are of greater moral worth. However, the critics still grant that the owls have some value from an aesthetic point of view. The second sort of criticism concerns what objects have the aesthetic value under consideration. Some species will be considered to be of marginal aesthetic value at best. Nonetheless, these critics surely consider some species to be aesthetic valuable. These worries are of a different sort than those generated by claims of intrinsic value.
8 Of course, there may not be any experts or appropriate spokespersons on such matters.
9 Nonetheless, both of Sagoffs arguments are questionable. First, Sagoff is right that biologists have found that there is functional redundancy in some ecosystems (Lawton and Brown 1993). However, he assumes that it is practically unlimited and this is not the case (Kinzig et.al. 2001). For example, ecologists Tilman and Downing (1994) determined, in the systems they studied, that there is a curvilinear relation between drought resistance and the number of plant species in an ecosystem. Thus, as the number of plant species increases the drought resistance of an ecosystem increases. However, once a certain level of species richness is attained, drought resistance does not change appreciably as new species are added. Tilmans work thus serves as an example of anecosystem in which there is some redundancy. Unfortunately, as we eliminate those redundant species we are quickly on the road to eliminating the entire functional group and hence the life-supporting service. Sagoffs second argument assumes that a species is important to ecosystem services only if it is a driver of the dynamics of an ecosystem. However, this is false. Many species do not drive the dynamics of a community but are necessary for the viability of the keystone species in the ecosystem.
10 Consider the following claim: a species or ecosystem has intrinsic value only if someone values or would value that species or ecosystem. Rolston disagrees with the claim since if no one values species or ecosystems either actually or even possibly, then on his view they still would possess intrinsic value. Callicott agrees with the claim since on his account it is necessary that someone values a species or ecosystem intrinsically if it is to have intrinsic value. Hence, there is a fundamental metaethical disagreement between them.
11 An anonymous referee offered the following argument: something is contextual value only if it is a value that drives or motivates an individual to engage in a certain kind of scientific activity. However, not all conservation biologists are driven or motivated to preserve biodiversity on the basis of human well-being. Hence, at least for those biologists it is not a contextual value. Here I would suggest that something is a contextual value only if it informs or is causally related to their scientific work--it need not drive their work. Human well-being can be a contextual value of biologists in this sense.
12 If the public did consider conservation biology to be biased because it has ethical foundations, then they must also view medicine as biased on pain of inconsistency.
13Incidentally, I do think that ecological systems can possess intrinsic value when suitably characterized (though my account of intrinsic value would differ from Rolston and Callicott). In a few words, my suggested account would be the following: x is intrinsically valuable just in case x would be intrinsically valued by a moral agent where that agent is fully informed and fully rational (see Brower, B. (1993), P. Railton (1986a, 1986b) for similar axiological approaches). There is no obvious reason why ecological systems cannot have intrinsic value on this account. Nonetheless, my worries concerning what such attributions can accomplish in the context of public policy and the damage they can bring to the extremely important work of biologists applies to this account as well. This account is as controversial as the ones that have been mentioned previously. But of course, particular normative and metaethical views can be philosophically sound and yet politically unpersuasive as justifications for various policies. Thanks for helpful comments on this point from an anonymous referee.
14 As an example of such confusions, see Chase 1995. Sometimes Chase does not clearly distinguish the biocentric philosophical views of some ecologists with their ontological claims made about the existence of ecosystems. Thus, his critique of ecosystem management suffers as a result.
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