III. What Should Conservation Biologists Advocate?
Clearly conservation biologists, if they are to be advocates, must have a position to advocate. We have seen this to be the preservation of biodiversity. They must also offer their reasons for preservation. There are several different options for why society ought to preserve biodiversity. Traditionally, there are instrumental reasons and there are non-instrumental reasons for preventing species extinctions. In the debate about the normative nature of conservation biology, many commentators have suggested that the reasons must concern the intrinsic value of biodiversity.
The reasons why we should preserve biodiversity need not concern the intrinsic value or worth of biodiversity though. Consider the fact that biodiversity provides society with much valued ecosystem services. That is, ecosystems provide purification of air and water, detoxification and decomposition of wastes, generation and renewal of soil, pollination of crops and plants, control of agricultural pests, and partial stabilization of climate (Daily 1997). These services all affect the good of the human species. If these services are not provided, and they most certainly could not be without many of our extant species and their interactions amongst one another and their abiotic environment, then our species would be direly affected. Hence, if our welfare is morally significant, then we ought to preserve biodiversity.
There are important issues that must be attended to in order to determine the soundness of this ecosystem services argument. For example, philosopher Marc Sagoff (Meffe, Carroll, et. al. 1997, 522-3) has argued that ecosystems contain immense functional redundancies. If one species goes extinct, there is a functionally equivalent surrogate which can take its place. Does the fact that there is some functional redundancy in ecosystems which can buffer the effects of some extinctions demonstrate that the extinction of species will not affect these services? Likewise, Sagoff claims that in some ecosystems the important interactions that shape ecosystem functions are between just a few keystone species. Many of the species in the ecosystem do not determine the relevant functions of an ecosystem in any direct way. Hence, most of the species in an ecosystem do not appreciably affect the ecosystem services performed. So the extinction of these species would not affect the good of humans.
Whatever one thinks of Sagoffs arguments we can see that what he and others consider controversial are empirical issues and not the moral claim that we ought to promote human well-being.9 This ecosystem services argument, though controversial, is unlike some of the arguments offered by some prominent conservation biologists. Some argue that we ought to preserve biodiversity because it has intrinsic value and here the argument is more controversial. Surely, we ought to preserve those objects which have intrinsic value but it becomes difficult to provide a reasonable and persuasive account of why and how populations, species, and ecosystems have such a value. Environmental philosophers are divided over these issues. For example, Bryan Norton (1992) and Anthony Weston (1988) are two notable critics of the claim that species and ecosystems have intrinsic value. Moreover, even those philosophers who agree that biodiversity is intrinsically valuable such as J. B. Callicott (1986) and Holmes Rolston III (1988) do not agree as to why it has such a value.10 Unlike the ecosystem services argument, the controversy concerns moral philosophy and it is unlikely that biology can resolve that.
Now consider the position of a conservation biologist who believes that biodiversity is intrinsically valuable and argues that species and ecosystems should be preserved on that basis. Clearly, an anti-environmental critic can and ought to ask why this is soon what basis do you believe this and on what basis should they believe this? If philosophers themselves are in radical disagreement on the subject what should we expect of biologists? Consider some of Takacs interviews of various biologists and their responses to questions concerning biodiversitys intrinsic value. David Ehrenfeld: For biological diversity, value is. Nothing more and nothing less. Well, I couldnt prove it, I guess. I just believe it. Paul Ehrlich: I just cant have the feeling that the only value they [species] might have is what they might mean to us. But you cant possibly defend that scientifically.
Jerry Franklin: Oh, I basically think so, yes. But I havent given a whole lot of thought to it.
Daniel Janzen: The word value is anthropocentric. Thats a contradiction in terms.
S. J. MacNaughton: I dont see how anything can have value outside of a value that human beings place on it, because value is really something uniquely human, isnt it?
David Pimmentel: [I]n trying to protect or conserve nature, to use the argument of intrinsic value gets youwell, I dont think it sells very well (1996, 249-52). Takacs concludes that a majority of the conservation biologists he interviewed believe that species have intrinsic value though many are reluctant to publicly offer arguments to this effect. We can see why from the above comments. To some of these scientists the notion of intrinsic value does not make sense, is not capable of being proven, is not persuasive, or they have not given it much thought. As Takacs, writes, Intrinsic value appeals to those with whom you dont need to argue that biodiversity has intrinsic value: they just agree with you (1996, 253).
Most commentators on values and the role of advocacy in conservation biology have insisted that biologists ought to promote the preservation of biodiversity because of its intrinsic value. We can see now that this is a problematic position. First, not all conservation biologists agree with the claim. Second, it is clear from the comments above that for many they consider it an intuition of sorts and is not something which they (self-admittedly) could or would want to defend. Third, insofar as environmental philosophers themselves are in radical disagreement over the nature and importance of the intrinsic value of nature, we should not expect conservation biologists to provide philosophical justifications of such attributions.
Scientists attempting to justify claims of intrinsic value can be especially problematic. Traditionally, science is portrayed as an enterprise where personal values are absent. Insofar as biologists offer such values as a basis for environmental decisionmaking and have no means of defending those values, they can lose scientific credibility amongst the public. They are likely to be perceived as biased and as serving the interests of liberal lobbying groups. In controversial environmental matters, credibility is of extreme importance in persuading the public to alter their consumptive lifestyles. Thus, if we want the public to respect the credibility of conservation biologists and their scientific work, then it is prudent that conservation biologists do not advocate the preservation of species and ecosystems on the basis of their intrinsic value.
Nonetheless, conservation biologists should be advocates in the robust sense offered above. If biodiversity affects the well-being of our species, and given that this is an uncontroversial good which is held by conservation biologists and the public at large, then scientists should advocate the preservation of ecological systems on the basis of those values. Recall that I characterized an advocate qua conservation biologist as a biologist who recommends a course of action in light of their values. Since conservation biologists consider the welfare of their fellow humans an important good, then they ought to advocate the preservation of biodiversity as it affects that good. Thus, there are contextual values which conservation biologists should advocate.11 I have used the terms ought and should in much of what has been discussed and have phrased the question under consideration as Should conservation biologists be advocates of the preservation of biodiversity? From this, one might conclude that I have argued that conservation biologists insofar as they have certain values and beliefs are morally obligated to advocate the preservation of biodiversity; i.e., it is morally impermissible for them not to do so. I do think that it is the responsibility of environmental scientists to offer their best advice about how we should live our lives in the natural world. Likewise, it would be inappropriate for the public to consider their advocacy as a sign of bias simply because they advocate an ethical position.12 The should I am mostly concerned with here is one of prudence. I have argued that promoting the preservation of biodiversity on the basis of claims of intrinsic value is a delicate enterprise. Here the problem lies in the fact that such attributions are difficult to defend by anyone including biologists. This is not to say that there is no place for this sort of advocacy. However, it becomes increasingly problematic when it casts doubt on the credibility of conservation biologists. There is a moral obligation of biologists to voice their considered moral judgements on policies which affect our well-being. It is prudentially inappropriate for conservation biologists to recommend policies to the public when those policies are to be justified by reference to the intrinsic value of non-human species.13
Finally, I want to consider where conservation biologists should advocate their ethical positions. Should such arguments be limited to informal arenas such as the lab or classroom or the non-technical literature such as Bioscience or Natural History? Should ethical arguments be offered in technical literature such as Conservation Biology, Biological Conservation, and Nature or in professional meetings? I have argued that it is most appropriate for conservation biologists to advocate the preservation of biodiversity when it is grounded in instrumentalist reasons pertaining to human goods. There are however a variety of forums for biologists to offer diverse opinions and arguments. Does it matter where their advocacy takes place?
As I argued above, advocacy becomes problematic when it affects the credibility of conservation biologists as biologists. However, the sorts of instrumentalist arguments that I discussed are just the sort that biologists are often well-equipped to discuss (as we saw with the ecosystem services argument). Moreover, it does not matter whether that forum is a technical one or not. In the case of advocacy of intrinsic values, the situation changes. The prudence of such advocacy is often dependent on the forum in which it takes place. It is clearly a very different circumstance when a conservation biologist offers their ethical views as an individual versus one in which they are speaking for conservation biology as a discipline.
As the forum changes from one in which a scientist can share their personal values and the audience expects this to one in which they do not, the appropriateness of the advocacy of intrinsic value changes as well. It is important that an audience does not confuse the personal values of a scientist with their empirical work. If the occasion is such that this is clear, then the advocacy of such values can be important and inspiring. If it is not clear, then it can be confusing and problematic. Anti-environmentalist skeptics often confuse scientific claims with ethical ones. This provides ammunition for individuals to confuse important controversial claims with scientifically credible ones.14
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